The Flag Salute Cases and the First Amendment by Gard, Stephen W.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1982
The Flag Salute Cases and the First Amendment
Stephen W. Gard
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen W. Gard, The Flag Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 Clev. St. L. Rev. 419 (1982)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/6
THE FLAG SALUTE CASES AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
STEPHEN W. GARD*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 419
II. JUSTICE JACKSON'S ABSOLUTISM VERSUS JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER'S BALANCING ........................... 421
III. Two DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIAL
F UNCTION . ............................................ 430
IV. Barnett AND THE BURGER COURT ....................... 435
V . CONCLUSION .......................................... 452
I. INTRODUCTION
N MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT V. GOBITIS' JUSTICE FRANKFURTER,
.speaking for a majority of the Court, held that public school students
could be compelled constitutionally to participate in a daily pledge of
allegiance and flag salute ceremony despite the children's sincere con-
scientious belief, as members of Jehovah's Witnesses, that such participa-
tion was explicitly forbidden by the Bible and would subject them to
eternal damnation.2 Justice Stone was the sole dissenter, arguing pas-
sionately that the compelled participation infringed upon the children's
constitutionally protected rights to religious freedom.' Despite the over-
whelming majority that Justice Frankfurter was able to garner in Gobitis,
the opinion was short lived. A mere two years later, Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy, who had joined in Justice Frankfurter's majority
opinion, took the extraordinary step of announcing in a dissenting opin-
ion in another, unrelated Jehovah's Witnesses case: "Since we joined in
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland
State University. B.A., DePauw University; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis
Law School; LL.M., University of Chicago.
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
2 The belief of the Jehovah's Witnesses is based on a literal understanding
of 20 Exodus 3-5:
3. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
4. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or
that is in the water under the earth;
5. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them ....
' 310 U.S. at 601.
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the opinion in the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion
to state that we now believe that it also was wrongly decided. 4 The follow-
ing year Gobitis was reversed, in one of the most celebrated overrulings
in American constitutional history, by West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette.'
In Barnette the majority opinion, written by Justice Jackson, held that
the coerced flag ceremony contravened the freedom of speech guarantee
of the first amendment.' Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy added con-
curring statements that the compelled pledge and salute also violated the
constitutionally protected religious freedom of the children.7 In stark con-
trast to Justice Frankfurter's leadership of the court in Gobitis, no other
Justice joined his dissenting opinion in Barnette.'
The flag salute cases have been a source of endless fascination for legal
and historical scholars.' Most of this large body of scholarship has focused
on the apparent oddity of Justice Frankfurter's view that there was no
constitutional infirmity in the "petty tyranny.. 0 of a governmental require-
ment that school children engage in a hypocritical affirmation of belief.1
Unfortunately, the doctrinal importance of the opinions of Justices Jackson
and Frankfurter in the flag salute cases as contrasting statements on the
interpretation of the freedom of speech guarantee of the first amendment'2
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, Douglas and Murphy,
JJ., dissenting). The dissenters' comments are even more striking in light of the
pointed effort made by the Jones majority to distinguish Gobitis as inapplicable
to that case. Id. at 598.
5 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
6 Id. at 625.
Id. at 643 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 644 (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
I See id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justices Reed and Roberts also
dissented but refused to concur in Justice Frankfurter's opinion. Id. at 642-43
(dissenting notation).
' See, e.g., H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981); D. MAN-
WARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR (1962); L. STEVENS, SALUTE! THE CASE OF THE
BIBLE VS. THE FLAG (1973); H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER-SCHOLAR ON THE
BENCH 45-68 (1960); Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in Felix Frankfurter's
First Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 257.
"0 Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251, 255 (S.D.W.Va.
1942), affjd, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
n Thus, the suggestions have been made that Justice Frankfurter's view was
attributable to the impact of "Frankfurter's own assimilation as an immigrant
Jew into American Life," Danzig, supra note 9, at 274; his "conception of the
role of the public schools as secular, nationalizing agencies," A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 33 (1978) and H. THOMAS, supra note
9; or his intense and contemporaneous involvement, as an advisor to President
Roosevelt, in the preparation of the nation for military intervention into World
War II, H. THOMAS, supra note 9, and Danzig, supra note 9, at 266-71.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the
freedom of speech ...."
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/6
FLAG SALUTE CASES
and the function of the judiciary in preserving our most precious civil
liberty has been almost wholly ignored.
There are several reasons why an examination of the cases from this
perspective is especially important. First, the major casebooks almost
uniformly treat Barnette and Gobitis as freedom of religion cases and ig-
nore Justice Jackson's significant contribution to free speech theory." Sec-
ond, the flag salute controversy has been revived recently in several cases
where the individual's motive for refusal to participate was not religious-
ly based. 4 Third, a proper appreciation of Barnette as an important free
speech precedent is necessary to a proper understanding of the constitu-
tionality of analogous governmental regulations, such as the requirement
that individuals, litigants and spectators alike, stand in a courtroom at
specified times as a gesture of respect. 5 Finally, the United States
Supreme Court has rediscovered Barnette, after years of desuetude, as
a major doctrinal freedom of expression precedent.1"
II. JUSTICE JACKSON'S ABSOLUTISM VERSUS JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER'S BALANCING
The issue of whether "balancing" or "absolutism" is the appropriate
mode of interpreting the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion has always been of central importance in first amendment
jurisprudence.17 Unfortunately, the issue was obscured by the misleading
13 See, e.g., E. BARRETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1476
(5th ed. 1977); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND OTHER PROBLEMS 1345 (4th ed. 1977); P. KAUPER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1247 (4th ed. 1972); W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES -COMMENTS -QUESTIONS
1265 (4th ed. 1975). The apparent exception, which perhaps proves the rule, is
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1045 (9th ed. 1975).
" See, e.g., Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973); Russo v. Central School
Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1972); Banks v. Board
of Public Educ., 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), affd mem., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th
Cir. 1971); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970); Frain v. Baron,
307 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
"5 Findings of contempt of court for refusal to stand in a gesture of respect
have been almost uniformly upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d
752 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975); In re Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th
Cir. 1972); Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1969); United States
ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969). Contra United States v.
Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974).
16 See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457
U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
17 See, e.g., Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424
(1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to
Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, The First Amend-
ment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964).
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and unproductive debate which occurred almost two decades ago between
Justice Harlan, representing the balancers, and Justice Black, represent-
ing the absolutists. 8 This debate suffered not only because the. absolutist
position became hopelessly confused with Justice Black's reliance on a
literal reading of the text of the first amendment,19 but also because Justice
Harlan "substitute[d] caricature for refutation"2 by representing Justice
Black's position as urging that the first amendment be treated as absolute
in scope." When the debate was waged in these terms it was a "fruitless
one."22 Two decades earlier, however, the debate was waged between
Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter on terms which illuminated rather
than obscured the real jurisprudential issue: whether the first amend-
ment should be interpreted as positive law with some judicially
discoverable essential meaning which it is the duty of the courts to en-
force fully, or whether the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expres-
sion should be treated by the courts as an interest which should be
balanced pragmatically against other important, governmental interests.2"
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, Justice Jackson's
majority opinion provided a lucid exposition of the absolutist view that
the first amendment embodies an essential meaning to which it is the
duty of the judiciary to afford absolute constitutional protection. Justice
Jackson approached the case from the perspective of the governmental
interests asserted in support of the flag salute requirement rather than
from a focus on the nature of the conduct of the particular Jehovah's
Witnesses children. The children's "possession of particular religious
beliefs" merely "supplie[d] appellees' motive for enduring the discomforts
of making the issue in this case," 4 and was irrelevant to the process of
See also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
718-22 (1978); L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582-84 (1978).
18 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); id. at 56 (Black, J., dissent-
ing); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); id. at 134 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
9 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting);
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. at 140-41 (Black, J., dissenting); Cahn, Justice
Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
549, 552-54 (1962).
1 Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245,
248.
21 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. at 49. Justice Black always placed
clear limits on his absolutism. See id. at 64 (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. at 141-42 (Black, J., dissenting); Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 428, 444 (1967).
1 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24 Id. at 634.
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constitutional decision-making. The crucial question was "whether such
a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be
imposed upon the individual by official authority under powers commit-
ted to any political organization under our Constitution.12' Thus, for the
Barnette majority the issue was not whether the children should be
allowed an exemption from a required ceremony, but whether govern-
mental officials had the legitimate authority to compel such participation
in the first instance.6 In order to answer this question it was necessary
to identify the interest the government was attempting to protect or pur-
sue by the means of the compulsory flag salute ceremony. Justice Jackson
first emphasized that the government's interest in preventing disruption
of the educational environment was not implicated in Barnette: "[T]he
refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere
with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in these
cases that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is
between authority and rights of the individual.""
Nor was the government's compulsion of the flag salute ceremony
grounded upon any official claim that the ritual had educational value.28
The sole governmental interest asserted in support of the officially man-
dated ceremony was the "promotion of national unity" or patriotism.29
The question presented for judicial resolution in Barnette, reasoned Justice
Jackson, was thus simply "whether under our Constitution compulsion
as here employed is a permissible means for [the] achievement"" of na-
tional unity or patriotism.
Justice Jackson, by stating the issue as the constitutional permissibil-
ity of the asserted governmental power to enforce patriotism by the means
of compelling an affirmation of belief rather than whether some individuals
were entitled to an exemption from a presumptively proper exercise of
governmental authority, avoided judicial consideration of the wisdom of
the state's policy:
Whether the First Amendment to the Constitution will permit
officials to order observance of ritual of this nature does not de-
pend upon whether as a voluntary exercise we would think it to
be good, bad or merely innocuous .... [V]alidity of the asserted
25 Id. at 636.
2" Id. at 634-36.
27 Id. at 630.
28 Id. at 631 n.12.
Id. at 626-28, 628 n.2, 631, 631 n.12, 640.
" Id. at 640. The Barnette majority stated that "In]ational unity as an end
which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question." Id.
Clearly, the government, which spends millions attempting to convince its citizens
of its goodness and virtue and persuade them of the wisdom of its policies and
personnel, has a legitimate interest in such activities. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717
(1977); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697-716 (1970).
19821
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power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any state-
ment of belief or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one
presents questions of power that must be considered indepen-
dently of any idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony
in question."
The majority opinion, rather than evaluating the wisdom of the govern-
mental policy, focused on the freedom of speech clause of the first amend-
ment and found that it contained a core of absolute protection which the
government could not infringe constitutionally regardless of any perceived
wisdom in so doing. No paraphrase can capture the eloquence of Justice
Jackson's statement of principle: "If there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."32
This, Barnette holds, is the essential meaning of the first amendment
which must be accorded absolute judicial protection: it is not the legitimate
business of government in this nation to prescribe the "right" opinion
for its citizens. False doctrine is absolutely protected by the first amend-
ment and no governmental official is constitutionally empowered to
penalize an individual for expressing a message the government disagrees
with or for refusing to express or affirm an idea which the government
endorses. This "freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not mat-
ter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the
existing order."3 This is not the entire scope of the first amendment and
no doubt the first amendment substantively limits governmental action
beyond that which the government attempts to justify on the grounds
of an official desire to penalize false doctrine.34 But the Barnette majority
clearly explicated the heart of the first amendment's command and had
no need to consider the periphery.
Justice Jackson supported this judicial interpretation of the freedom
of speech clause of the first amendment on both utilitarian and
philosophical grounds. His first, pragmatic rationale was that the sup-
pression of dissent inevitably leads to the suppression of dissenters and
this, in return, leads to the disregard of all liberty: "Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity
of the graveyard."'3 5
The progress of the flag salute controversy is itself evidence that Justice
Jackson's argument was not fanciful. For the Gobitis majority the prac-
3 319 U.S. at 634.
32 Id. at 642.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 633-34.
31 Id. at 641.
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tical consequence of an individual's refusal to participate in the flag salute
ceremony was merely the expense of a private education. a6 In fact,
however, as a result of official efforts to enforce the requirement, parents
had been subjected to the threat of imprisonment, and children were sub-
jected to the threat of being made wards of the state and of being removed
from the custody of their parents.37
The Barnette majority was not content, however, to rest its opinion
on utilitarian grounds. The majority ultimately based its interpretation
of the freedom of speech clause on the very nature of our democratic
form of government:
There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or
of the nature or origin of its authority. We set up government
by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those
in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority
here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by
authority.'
Justice Jackson did not balance or "categorize" competing interests in
Barnette and somehow decide that the government's interest in compel-
ling an affirmation of belief in a "correct" point of view was out-weighed
by an interest in being free of such coercion. 9 Instead, the Barnette major-
ity enunciated an absolute first amendment principle traceable to the role
of freedom of expression in a self-governing democracy.
There was nothing unique in Justice Jackson's recognition of the fun-
damental principle that, in a democracy, the government is absolutely
barred from prescribing or proscribing any individual activity on the
grounds of official agreement or disagreement with the ideological message
the activity is believed by the government to express. A long line of im-
pressive precedent supported this interpretation of the freedom of ex-
pression guarantee of the first amendment.' Indeed, this was the Supreme
Court's explicit rationale, in Stromberg v. California,4' for holding that
36 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 592 (1940).
2 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629. See also Bolling v. Superior Court, 133 P.2d 803
(Wash. 1943) (reversing court order declaring children wards of the court and
ordering their removal from parents' home); In re Latrecchia, 128 N.J.L. 472,
26 A.2d 881 (1942) (reversing criminal conviction).
38 319 U.S. at 641.
31 Such is the mode of first amendment analysis offered by some modern first
amendment theorists. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 580-84; Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied
to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
40 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937); United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Cf. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
41 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
1982]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:419
a state could not constitutionally penalize the display of a red flag as a
symbol of opposition to organized government. The difference between
Barnette and Stromberg, as Justice Jackson observed, was an emotional,
not an analytical one: in Barnette "the flag involved [was] our own."42
The focus of the Barnette majority on the nature of the applicable
governmental regulation rather than the character of the activity of the
Jehovah's Witnesses children gave its opinion an analytical beauty and
clarity which represents the finest tradition of-first amendment
jurisprudence. 3 The Barnette majority was thus able to avoid considera-
tion of the wisdom of the state's policy," consideration of the impossible
issue of whether the children's refusal to participate in the ceremony con-
stituted expression or action," and consideration of whether the children's
activity should be characterized as political or religious expression." The
reality, fully recognized by Justice Jackson, is that whenever the govern-
ment seeks to compel or prohibit any activity because of the state's agree-
ment or disagreement with the message that activity is officially believed
to express, the government's conduct gives that activity both an ex-
pressive character and a political significance.4 7 This is true regardless
of whether the individual subjected to the governmental regulation is
aware of the fact." By reasoning from the perspective of the character
42 319 U.S. at 641.
4' For more recent examples of this mode of first amendment analysis, see
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
" 319 U.S. at 634.
45 Thus, while Justice Jackson found that the state-mandated ceremony was
expressive in character, he did not find it necessary to inquire whether the refusal
to participate in such a ceremony was expressive. Id. at 632-34.
It is today recognized that no sound first amendment doctrine can be founded
on a purported analytical distinction between expression and action. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 598-601; Ely, supra note 39, at 1493-96; Kalven, The
Concept of the Public Forum; Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
46 319 U.S. at 634-35. Attempts have been made to ground first amendment
theory on a supposed distinction between "political" speech and other categories
of speech. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An In-
quiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971). The intellectual inadequacy of such attempts is explained in H. KALVEN,
THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 46-50 (1965); Kalven, The Metaphysics
of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10-13.
" 319 U.S. at 631, 640-41.
48 Thus, for example, in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977),
the individuals merely wished to express a willingness to engage in a simple com-
mercial transaction by placing "For Sale" signs on the front lawns of homes of-
fered for sale, but the government attempted to prohibit such activity because
it perceived the signs as expressing the message that the community was a racially
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/6
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of the governmental regulation, the Barnette majority was able to an-
nounce an absolute first amendment principle: in a democracy the govern-
ment has no lawful authority to compel the expression of a "correct" opin-
ion or to prohibit the expression of an "erroneous" opinion.49
Justice Frankfurter's balancing approach in the flag salute controversy
was different in every respect from the Barnette majority's reliance on
absolute legal principles derived from the essential meaning of the first
amendment. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter explicitly denied the very exis-
tence of absolute legal principles." On the basis of this premise Justice
Frankfurter necessarily perceived the court's role in the flag salute con-
troversy as the pragmatic reconciliation of two competing interests."
Justice Frankfurter fortified his reliance upon a balancing approach by
analogy 52 to the secular regulation rule which was then used by the court
in freedom of religion cases.' Under the secular regulation rule, "[con-
scientious scruples [do not relieve] the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs."' '
Contrary to Justice Frankfurter's initial premise, the secular regulation
rule did, by implication, recognize an absolute legal principle which even
Justice Frankfurter was willing to honor: "If the avowed or intrinsic
legislative purpose is either to promote or to discourage some religious
community or creed, it is clearly within the constitutional restrictions
imposed on legislatures and cannot stand."' The proper analogy from the
freedom of religion clause to the freedom of speech clause would seem
obvious; the former is designed to prohibit governmentally imposed
unstable, undesirable place to live. Id. at 96-97. See also Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not always been true to Justice
Jackson's insight. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 n.10 (1977); Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
4 319 U.S. at 642. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
' Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 ("[njo single principle
can answer all of life's complexities."). See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 524 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594 ("Our present task, then .... is to reconcile two
rights in order to prevent either from destroying the other.").
" Id. at 595 ("Nor does the freedom of speech assured by Due Process move
in a more absolute circle of immunity than that enjoyed by religious freedom.").
5 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The secular regula-
tion doctrine has been since repudiated by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Even-
tually even Justice Frankfurter was to reject the secular regulation rule. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
310 U.S. at 594.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 651 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593.
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religious orthodoxy and the latter clause prohibits governmentally im-
posed political orthodoxy. Indeed, a respectable body of Supreme Court
precedent has reached precisely this conclusion.' Justice Frankfurter,
however, not only ignored these cases but also failed to recognize the
analogy: "An act compelling profession of allegiance to a religion, no mat-
ter how subtly or tenuously promoted, is bad. But an act promoting good
citizenship and national allegiance is within the domain of governmental
authority . . .. ,57
Justice Frankfurter also attempted to justify his balancing methodology
by the citation of Schneider v. State,5M a then recent free speech case in
which the Supreme Court had utilized a similar mode of reasoning in order
to invalidate state anti-littering statutes which prohibited the distribu-
tion of handbills. Unfortunately, Schneider was simply not apposite to the
type of governmental regulation at issue in the flag salute cases. The
statutes in Schneider were time, place and manner regulations which pro-
hibited all handbilling without reference to the ideological message the
handbills contained.,9 The flag salute requirement was fundamentally dif-
ferent because it was explicitly justified by reference to the ideological
message the expression of which the government was attempting to
coerce. In the past, when the Court had been confronted with similar con-
tent regulations, it had never used a balancing test."
Even assuming that reliance on Schneider v. State supported rather
than refuted the propriety of applying a balancing test in the flag salute
cases, the issue remains whether Justice Frankfurter applied that test
in a defensible manner. Here again we find Justice Frankfurter's mode
of analysis seriously deficient. Justice Frankfurter not only assumed the
crucial question of the very legitimacy of the governmentally compelled
flag salute ceremony,6 but he inflated its importance beyond recognition.
Thus, in Justice Frankfurter's hands, the governmental purpose of in-
stilling patriotism and national unity was equated with the government's
interest in protecting the "national security" and labelled as "an interest
inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values." 2
After inflating the governmental interest in compelling participation
in a flag salute ceremony into an interest in preserving the security of
5 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
" 319 U.S. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
" Id. at 154-58.
See, e.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also Kalven, supra note
45, at 23-25.
6" See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598 ("Surely, however, the end is legitimate.").
62 Id. at 595. For further discussion of Frankfurter's inflation and deflation
of the characterization of governmental interests as a judicial technique, see Dan-
zig, supra note 9, at 259-66.
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the nation in time of war Justice Frankfurter then relied on this
characterization of the importance of the governmental interest to justify
a refusal to scrutinize judicially the appropriateness or efficacy of the
means chosen by the government to achieve its purpose: "The wisdom
of training children in patriotic impulses by those compulsions which
necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our in-
dependent judgment. Even were we convinced of the folly of such a
measure, such belief would be no proof of its unconstitutionality." 3
By the sleight of hand of inflating the governmental interest and then
relying on that inflation to justify a refusal to scrutinize the means chosen
by the government to achieve its purpose Justice Frankfurter wholly
avoided the question, considered by Justice Jackson, of whether "the
strength of the government to maintain itself would be impressively vin-
dicated by... confirming power of the State to expel a handful of children
from school."64 Regardless of the importance of the state's ultimate in-
terest, certainly it must be recognized that the means chosen to achieve
that purpose may be so inefficient as to render the infringement on con-
stitutionally protected liberties gratuitous: "[S]urely at some point, not
too remote, the unwisdom of the state's policy undermines the legitimate
interest of the state. Or to put this another way, the legitimate interest
of a state in foolish legislation is difficult to isolate."65
Perhaps less apparent, but equally true, it is also possible that the means
chosen by the state to achieve its goal might be positively counter-
productive and destructive of the purposes sought to be attained by the
state. This was precisely the situation regarding the compulsory flag salute
ceremony in the eloquent concurring opinion of Judge Lehman of the New
York Court of Appeals: "The flag is dishonored by a salute by a child
in reluctant and terrified obedience to a command of secular authority
which clashes with the dictates of conscience. The flag 'cherished by all
our hearts' should not be soiled by the tears of a little child."66
When we shift our focus from the government's interest to the first
amendment side of Justice Frankfurter's balance, his performance in the
flag salute cases becomes no more impressive. Against the government's
interest, Justice Frankfurter merely weighed the free speech interest of
the Jehovah's Witnesses children instead of society's interest in freedom
of expression. 7 The objection to such a skewed weighting of the com-
peting interests is well known. Justice Frankfurter, however, proceeded
Id. at 598. See also id. at 595, distinguishing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636.
65 H. KALVEN, supra note 46, at 89.
" People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 279 N.Y. 523, 539, 18 N.E.2d 840, 847 (1939).
67 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594, 599-600; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 653, 655.
" See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
1982]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:419
to diminish the free speech side of the scale even further by characteriz-
ing the Jehovah's Witnesses children as "dissidents"69 whose religious
beliefs were "obnoxious to the cherished beliefs of others."7 When the
government's interests in preserving national security, without regard
to the efficacy of the means chosen to achieve this end, were weighed
against the claim that "exceptional immunity ... be given to dissidents,"71
Justice Frankfurter's conclusion was foregone. All that remained was the
gratuitous additional argument that the free speech claim of the Jehovah's
Witnesses was further diminished because "the effective means of induc-
ing political changes [were] left free from interference."72 This argument,
however, is nothing more than the old invocation of the right-privilege
distinction73 which had been rebutted in a similar context in Schneider
v. State: "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place."
The contrast between the opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
in the flag salute cases could not be more vivid. On the one hand, Justice
Jackson resolved the compulsory flag salute issue by invoking an absolute
principle traceable to the freedom of expression clause of the first amend-
ment. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, never directly addressed
the merits of the legal principle invoked by Justice Jackson, but dismissed
it with the general observation that there could be no absolute legal prin-
ciples. Instead of relying on principle to resolve the flag salute controversy,
Justice Frankfurter judicially duplicated the pragmatic balancing of in-
terests which had been undertaken by a coordinate branch of the state
government upon the enactment of the flag salute requirement. Justice
Frankfurter upheld the exertion of governmental power to coerce par-
ticipation in a patriotic ceremony by assuming the legitimacy and impor-
tance of the state's interest, ignoring the efficacy of the means chosen
to achieve that interest and devaluing the dignity of the freedom of ex-
pression claim championed by the Jehovah's Witnesses children.
III. Two DIFFERING CONCEPTIONS OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson invoked two entirely different con-
69 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 599-600; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 653, 655 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
70 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594.
71 Id. at 599-600.
72 Id. at 600.
" Cf. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
14 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). For modern invocations of this principle, see Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
757 n.15 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974).
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ceptions of the proper interpretation of the freedom of speech clause of
the first amendment. In addition, both attempted to justify their flag salute
opinions by reference to two entirely different conceptions of the ap-
propriate judicial function in reviewing the constitutionality of govern-
mental regulations.
Justice Frankfurter initiated the larger debate on the proper mode of
utilization of the power of judicial review. He argued strenuously that
his result in Gobitis upholding the compulsory flag salute ceremony was
dictated by the necessity of observing appropriate limitations on the
Court's power to determine the constitutionality of governmental
regulations. 5 Arguably, his advocacy of judicial self-restraint did not in-
fluence his substantive decision on the freedom of expression issue; rather
it was his mode of interpreting the first amendment which necessitated
his philosophy of judicial self-restraint.
Justice Frankfurter emphasized three interrelated themes in support
of his conception of the judicial function. First, in Justice Frankfurter's
view, there is only one test of the constitutionality of governmental regula-
tions regardless of which provision of the Bill of Rights is invoked in op-
position to the claim of legitimate authority: "There is no warrant in the
constitutional basis of this Court's authority for attributing different roles
to it depending upon the nature of the challenge to the legislation ...
[Tihe function of this Court does not differ in passing on the constitu-
tionality of legislation challenged under different Amendments."76
Second, the one universal test which Justice Frankfurter believed ap-
propriate to test judicially the constitutionality of governmental regula-
tions was the "rational basis" test:
We may deem it a foolish measure, but the point is that this Court
is not the organ of government to resolve doubts as to whether
it will fulfill its purpose. Only if there be no doubt that any
reasonable mind could entertain can we deny to the states the
right to resolve doubts their way and not ours.
Finally, the third underlying premise for Justice Frankfurter's
philosophy of judicial self-restraint was his view that the institution of
judicial review is fundamentally undemocratic:
The reason why from the beginning even the narrow judicial
authority to nullify legislation has been viewed with a jealous eye
is that it serves to prevent the full play of the democratic pro-
"5 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598-600; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646-71 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
76 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 648-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 661-62. See also id. at 666: "[Slome other tests of constitutionality
must surely be guiding the Court than the absence of a rational justification for
the legislation. But I know of no other test which this Court is authorized to
apply in nullifying legislation."
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cess. The fact that it may be an undemocratic aspect of our scheme
of government does not call for its rejection or its disuse. But
it is the best of reasons, as this Court has frequently recognized,
for the greatest caution in its use."'
Justice Frankfurter clearly explained the interdependence of the three
rationales for judicial self-restraint: "If the function of this Court is to
be essentially no different from that of a legislature, if the considerations
governing constitutional construction are to be substantially those that
underlie legislation, then indeed judges should not have life tenure and
they should be made directly responsible to the electorate."'" Thus, for
Justice Frankfurter the anti-majoritarianism of the Court's argument for
judicial review was philosophically dependent on the appropriateness of
the rational basis test of the constitutionality of governmental regula-
tions. In addition to this philosophic argument, Justice Frankfurter sug-
gested a pragmatic justification for judicial self-restraint which related
to his concern for democratic self-government. In Justice Frankfurter's
view, judicial self-restraint would result in the legislature taking its respon-
sibilities more seriously and, consequently, lead to the "abandonment of
foolish legislation."" Of course, such a normative proposition is incapable
of empirical verification. But if the aftermath of the Gobitis opinion is
any indication of the wisdom of Justice Frankfurter's argument, the ver-
dict is unequivocal. After the Gobitis decision was announced there was
a manifold increase in the number of state and local governments in-
stituting or enforcing compulsory flag salute requirements" and a wave
of anti-Jehovah's Witness persecution and violence swept across the
country."2
Before considering the validity of Justice Frankfurter's underlying
premise for judicial self-restraint and concern for democratic decision-
making, that the proper judicial function is no different from the legislative
function, the wisdom of the rational basis test he utilized to determine
the constitutionality of governmental regulations should be addressed.
What is most striking about this "test" is that it is not a test at all, but
merely an admonition to judicial self-restraint. Thus, while Justice
Frankfurter would caution that the wisdom of a governmental regulation
is no criterion for its constitutionality,83 the rational basis test is essen-
tially a measure of legislative wisdom. Only if a statute is so unwise that
no "legislators could in reason have enacted such a law" is the Court en-
titled to hold the statute unconstitutional. 4 The reason why the wisdom
7' Id. at 650.
7' Id. at 652.
" Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
8' See D. MANWARING, supra note 9, at 187.
92 See id. at 163-86; L. STEVENS, supra note 9, at 106-16.
83 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647, 661, 670.
'4 Id. at 647.
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of a statute will assure its constitutionality but the foolishness of a statute
will not guarantee its unconstitutionality is simply Justice Frankfurter's
belief in judicial self-restraint. In this light it is not surprising that the
rational basis test is virtually always satisfied.15 Not only does this test
negatively define the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amend-
ment as that speech which no reasonable person could conceive of a reason
to suppress," but in the hands of Justice Frankfurter this test operated
like a rachet to contract progressively the scope of constitutionally pro-
tected liberty. Thus, in Justice Frankfurter's view the fact that the Court
previously had upheld the compulsory flag salute ceremony foreclosed
the issue of whether reasonable minds could differ on its constitutionality. 87
Justice Frankfurter's underlying premise for judicial self-restraint, that
the only test of the constitutionality of governmental regulations is
whether the regulation could have been enacted by a rational legislature,
is itself subject to serious challenge. In passing on the constitutionality
of the compulsory flag salute ceremony, Justice Frankfurter inquired only
as to whether a reasonable legislator could believe that such a coerced
ritual would further the governmental purpose of encouraging patriotism
and national unity.8 Justice Frankfurter did not attempt to determine
judicially what the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment might
say about the permissibility of such a ceremony. The irony of Justice
Frankfurter's test of constitutionality is that in its application the Bill
of Rights is irrelevant. Here, Justice Frankfurter's position that there
are no absolutes, that the freedom of speech clause has no essential core
meaning can be contrasted profitably with his opinion in Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education." The issue in McCollum was whether
the "released time" program for religious instruction for public school
premises violated the first amendment's proscription of the establishment
of religion. Justice Frankfurter's position was that the program was un-
constitutional, not because a reasonable mind could not entertain it, but
because "the basic Constitutional principle of absolute separation was
violated." 0 The absoluteness of Justice Frankfurter's interpretation of
the establishment of religion clause was clear: "Separation means separa-
tion, not something less .... It is the Court's duty to enforce this princi-
ple in its full integrity." 1 Ultimately, the difference between his judicial
5 See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 205-10 (1960); M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: The Supreme Court
and Judicial Review 16 (1966).
86 See Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1441-44
(1962).
87 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 664-65.
88 See id. at 652, 661-62; Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598-600.
89 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 231.
91 Id.
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self-restraint in the flag salute cases and his refusal to defer to the
legislative judgment in McCollum was simply that Justice Frankfurter
believed that the establishment clause had a meaning, while he was unable
to discover any core meaning in the freedom of speech clause. It is almost
as if Justice Frankfurter declared the free speech clause of the first amend-
ment void for vagueness. 9
Justice Jackson's view of the judicial function was also dependent upon
his interpretation of the first amendment. Since, in his view, the essen-
tial meaning of the first amendment was the prohibition of the use of
governmental power in an attempt to coerce political orthodoxy, it was
clear that the compelled flag salute ceremony struck at the very heart
of constitutionally protected liberty.93 While the courts should grant
deference to legislative and executive policy judgments when governmen-
tal action touches the periphery of constitutional concerns, 94 no such
deference is appropriate when governmental action contravenes the essen-
tial meaning of the first amendment: "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."95
Justice Jackson held that the Court's authority, indeed its duty, to in-
terpret and enforce the freedom of speech clause of the first amendment
is derived from the positive law status of that constitutional provision.
Thus, Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Barnette foreshadowed the
persuasive views of such eminent legal scholars as Professors Black and
Wechsler and placed the judicial protection of the first amendment on
the firmest possible foundation.9"
Justice Jackson did not pretend that the Court's responsibility to ascer-
tain the often murky purposes of the Bill of Rights was an easy one,97
nor can it be doubted that the Court will occasionally err in the exercise
of its duties. The Supreme Court is not unique in its capacity to err and
the Constitution contains its own correctives for judicial missteps. Perhaps
the most important point, however, is that in its exercise of the historically
accepted power of judicial review the Court is not to act as a super-
legislature or as a national school board, reweighing the wisdom of govern-
mental policies. In Justice Jackson's words:
92 Cf., Mendelson, The First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to
Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
9 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connec-
ticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
See C. BLACK, supra note 85, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Con-
stitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
" See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of of-
ficial authority depend upon our possession of marked competence
in the field where the invasion of rights occurs .... [W]e act in
these matters not by authority of our competence but by force
of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of
our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold
the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this
Court when liberty is infringed.98
The function of the Supreme Court is to act as the expositor and guard-
ian of the fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution. One of
those principles, contained in the freedom of speech clause of the first
amendment, is that the government is constitutionally proscribed from
compelling the affirmation of a "correct" idea or from penalizing the ex-
pression of an "erroneous" idea. In a democracy there is no place for
governmentally coerced political orthodoxy.
IV. Barnette AND THE BURGER COURT
A reconsideration of the implications of the Flag Salute cases is a par-
ticularly worthy enterprise at the present time because they bring
together three themes of unparalleled contemporary interest. First, West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Minersville School
District v. Gobitis provide an important perspective on the perennially
controversial issue of the appropriate judicial function in reviewing the
constitutionality of governmental regulations. There is today in the legal
literature a renaissance in scholarly and theoretical works on the subject
of judicial review.9 No doubt the Flag Salute cases rival the famous foot-
note four in United States v. Carolene Products... as the proper center-
piece for a meaningful theory of judicial review.'
Second, the jurisprudence of the freedom of speech clause of the first
amendment, while always a popular topic for scholarly endeavor, is
presently the subject of uncommonly intense critical analyses."° Again,
98 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639-40.
See, e.g., P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contribu-
tions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Sym-
posium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
'0 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
"'1 See supra Section III.
102 See, e.g., M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (forth-
coming 1983-84); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982);
M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1982); F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN
A FREE SOCIETY (1981); A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1980).
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Barnette and Gobitis potentially provide an enlightened starting point for
an appropriate theory of the meaning of the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression in a democratic society. '°"
Third, Justice Frankfurter's proper place in history has been subjected
recently to intense re-evaluation by a new generation of biographers °0 4
and his disciples have been quick to rise to his defense.1 ' No doubt this
debate is also destined to be a recurring one. It is equally clear that
Barnette and Gobitis, more than any of Frankfurter's other opinions, will
be at the heart of this debate.
Each of these three themes has its own allure as a topic for further
exposition. My purpose here, however, is more modest. Professor Hirsch
has identified Barnette as the turning point of Frankfurter's career on
the Supreme Court. His leadership was rejected by the Court and he was
relegated to the position of a dissenter for his remaining twenty years
on the bench.1 °6 Joseph Lash's judgment is even more harsh. In his view,
the Flag Salute cases "uncoupled [Justice Frankfurter] from the locomotive
of history." ' 7 No doubt Justice Frankfurter served as a foil rather than
a guru for the Warren Court. What is less clear, however, is whether
Justice Frankfurter's jurisprudence remains in bad odor. Here, the view
of Justice Douglas is significant: "Most of Frankfurter's decisions at the
constitutional level were eroded within a few years after he retired, in
1962, only to be refurbished when the Nixon appointees arrived..... There
is thus merit in a brief examination of the stature of Barnette, and the
opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in the first amendment
jurisprudence of the Burger Court. For this purpose, the recent case of
Wooley v. Maynard'"° is especially noteworthy.
In 1977, after years of desuetude, the United States Supreme Court
rediscovered Barnette as a major first amendment freedom of expression
precedent. In Wooley v. Maynard,"0 the plaintiffs, Jehovah's Witnesses,
1o3 See supra Section II.
104 See, e.g., B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION (1982); H.
HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981).
... See, e.g., Cohen, Book Review, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1327 (1982) (reviewing
H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)); Danelski, Book Review,
96 HARV. L. REV. 312 (1982) (reviewing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER (1981)); French, Book Review, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330 (1982) (review-
ing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)); Dorsen, Book
Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1981) (reviewing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER (1981)); Stone, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 346 (1981) (review-
ing H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)).
106 H. HIRSCH, supra note 104, at 147-76.
107 J. LASH, A BRAHMIN OF THE LAW: A BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY IN FROM THE
DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 73 (J. Lash ed. 1975).
100 W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1938-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 22 (1980).
109 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
110 Id.
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challenged the constitutionality of New Hampshire statutes which required
the display of the state motto "Live Free or Die" on the license plates
of privately-owned passenger vehicles and criminalized the obscuring of
the motto."' The plaintiffs, George and Maxine Maynard, had been thrice
arrested and convicted for covering up the state motto on the license
plates of their automobiles with red reflective tape.' 2 They objected, on
religious, political and philosophical grounds, to being coerced by the state
into publicly advertising an ideological slogan they found abhorrent."3 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the federal district court's issuance
of an injunction prohibiting further prosecution of the plaintiffs for tap-
ing over the state motto on their license plates."'
As in Barnette, the judicial focus in Wooley could have been on either
the nature of Maynard's activity or on the character of the governmental
regulation. Much of the criticism and confusion surrounding Wooley is
due to a misguided insistence that first amendment adjudication requires
an evaluation of the nature of the individual's activity in order to deter-
mine whether it is constitutionally protected."' From this perspective the
issue in Wooley would be framed in one, or both, of two ways: 1) whether
the Maynards had been engaged in the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected symbolic expression, or 2) whether the Maynards' first amendment
right to be free of any governmentally compelled affirmation of belief
had been infringed."'
In contrast, Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion after a brief, un-
fortunate and unnecessary dalliance with an examination of the nature
Id. at 707, 709.
" Id. at 708.
"1 Id. at 707. Mr. Maynard described his objection in an affidavit:
[Bly religious training and belief, I believe my "government" -Jehovah's
Kingdom-offers everlasting life. It would be contrary to that belief to
give up my life for the state, even if it meant living in bondage. Although
I obey all laws of the State not in conflict with my conscience, this slogan
is directly at odds with my deeply held religious convictions.... I also
disagree with the motto on political grounds. I believe that life is more
precious than freedom.
Id. at 707 n.2.
"I Id. at 717, affd, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976). The majority opinion was
written by Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 706. Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun
dissented on the merits. Id. at 719. Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun, dissented on the ground that the issuance of the injunction was
barred by principles of equitable restraint. Id. at 717. For discussion of this issue,
see Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133 (1977).
... See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Gaebler,
First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and
Association, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995 (1982) is representative of the law review
literature.
1"' See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 719-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1976).
1982]
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1982
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:419
of the Maynards' activity, ultimately focused properly on the character
of the governmental regulation and stated the dispositive issue to be
"whether the State may constitutionally require an individual .to par-
ticipate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it
on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that
it be observed and read by the public.""'
It is profitable to focus initially on the analytical problems inherent
in the first two phrasings of the issue in Wooley, issue characterizations
which find their roots in the methodology of Justice Frankfurter's dis-
sent in Barnette. First, if the critical inquiry is deemed to be whether
the Maynards' activity of obscuring the state motto on their license plates
constitutes constitutionally protected symbolic expression then the
judiciary necessarily must decide two difficult factual questions: whether
the Maynards possessed "[ain intent to convey a particularized message,"
and whether, "in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."".8 Assum-
ing that there is any intellectual coherence in a distinction between "ex-
pression" and "action,"".9 a focus on the nature of the individuals' activity
serves only the single purpose of narrowing the scope of constitutional
protection, thereby turning the first amendment on its head. Instead of
the first amendment fulfilling its proper role as "an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of [governmental] power,"'2 0 this methodology
places the first amendment as a barrier which the private litigant must
hurdle as a condition precedent to judicial consideration of a claim of
governmental infringement of the constitutional guarantee.
Furthermore, the application of this approach requires the abandon-
ment of principle in favor of judicial fact-finding of "facts" incapable of
objective ascertainment. Before it can be determined whether the par-
ticularized message of an activity is understood by those who view it,
several value judgments must be made. Thus, it must be judicially decided
who constitutes the relevant audience, what proportion of that audience
must understand the message and how precisely the message must be
understood.'2'
".. 430 U.S. at 713.
. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974).
"' Professor Kalven, however, demonstrated the analytical futility of this pur-
ported distinction many years ago in his seminal essay, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 12. For more recent, derivative
scholarship criticizing the "expression"-"action" distinction, see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 598-601 (1978); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
12 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (J. Madison ed. 1789).
121 The built-in bias against new ideas should be noted here. The very re-
quirements of audience understanding necessitates previous audience familiarity
with the message and ignores the function of symbols in arousing curiosity about
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When the governmental interest supporting a regulation is to burden
the expressive content of the individuals' activity, then this focus is
distinctly non-neutral. It serves only to expand the power of the govern-
ment to suppress the ideological message of activities it finds expressive.
Moreover, once this barrier is overcome, a judicial focus on the nature
of the individuals' activity provides, as Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion in Barnette demonstrates, no standards or guidance for the resolu-
tion of the substantive issue of whether the activity can be regulated
consistent with the Constitution. No doubt, then, Chief Justice Burger
was wise to refuse to pass on the symbolic expression "issue" which he
appropriately considered unnecessary to a principled decision in Wooley.' "
The second possible statement of the issue in Wooley, whether the
Maynards' first amendment right to be free of any governmentally com-
pelled affirmation of belief had been violated, also mandates a judicial
inquiry into the nature of the individuals' activity rather than the character
of the governmental regulation. Both the majority opinion and the dis-
senting opinion devoted attention to this issue. Chief Justice Burger,
although asserting that Barnette "involved a more serious infringement
upon personal liberties"'2 3 than Wooley, had no difficulty in concluding
that the New Hampshire statute "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control."'24 In contrast, Justice Rehnquist reached
precisely the opposite conclusion. These two opinions demonstrate the-
an idea. See, e.g., the testimony of George Maynard:
A lot of people stop me. And one person says, "You can't do that. That's
against the law." I says "Fortunately, I was given permission by the
Federal Court in a temporary injunction against the State." And here
I was able to converse with him and express my beliefs and my reason
for doing so. And so, therefore, I was able to bear witness to the truth
of God's Kingdom.
Brief for Appellee at 60-61, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
'" 430 U.S. at 713. In an unfortunate footnote, however, Chief Justice Burger
declared that display of special license plates issued by the state without the
state motto would not be "sufficiently communicative to sustain a claim of sym-
bolic expression." Id. at 713 n.10. Obviously, if the state issued such license plates
to the Maynards, the symbolic expression would never arise. Chief Justice Burger
then compounded confusion and demonstrated the intellectual difficulties inherent
in a judicial focus on the nature of the individuals' activity by concluding that
the Maynards' prayer for issuance of "expurgated" license plates "substantially
undermined" their claim that taping over the state motto on the license plates
they were issued constituted symbolic expression. Id. A more plausible inter-
pretation of the Maynards' position, however, is simply that while they would
have preferred to remain silent by displaying "expurgated" license plates, never-
theless if the state insisted on coercing them into entering public debate by display-
ing the state motto, then they were constitutionally entitled to symbolically ex-
press their opposition by covering the motto.
,23 430 U.S. at 715.
124 Id., quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943).
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analytical incoherence, originally found in Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in Barnette, of focusing on the nature of the individuals' activity. Two
flaws are particularly striking: 1) such a focus forces the Court to aban-
don doctrinal principle in favor of artificial line drawing between com-
peting interests, and 2) such a focus erects an improper barrier which
the litigant must overcome before the constitutional propriety of the
government's conduct can be judicially reviewed.
The first analytical flaw is most apparent in Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion. In his view there would be no unconstitutional affirma-
tion of belief unless the individual was placed "in the position of either
apparently or actually 'asserting as true' the [government's] message."1 2 5
The doctrinal poverty of this test, despite its facial allure as a statement
of constitutional principle, is most clearly demonstrated by an examina-
tion of the hypothetical cases suggested by Justice Rehnquist and the
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Prune Yard Shopping Center v.
Robins."'
Three examples of unconstitutional governmentally compelled affirma-
tion of belief situations were offered in the dissenting opinion. First,
Barnette was accepted as correctly decided -the government cannot con-
stitutionally compel an individual to participate in a flag salute ceremony.',
Additionally, Justice Rehnquist opined that either "wearing a lapel but-
ton promoting a political candidate or waving a flag as a symbolic gesture"
solely because of governmental coercion would constitute an infringement
of constitutionally protected individual liberty.1 28
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist offered two counter-examples which, like
the state motto embossed on the New Hampshire license plates, would
not constitute an unconstitutional governmentally compelled affirmation
of belief in his opinion. One was the mottoes "In God We Trust" and "E
Pluribus Unum" which appear on American money.2 9 The other example
was the erection by the government at taxpayers' expense of "a multitude
of billboards, each proclaiming 'Live Free or Die.' "130 Prune Yard Shopp-
ing Center v. Robins13 serves as another such example. In Robins the
United States Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally re-
quire a privately owned shopping mall to allow third persons to speak,
distribute pamphlets and circulate petitions on its premises. The argu-
ment of Prune Yard Shopping Center that it was being compelled, in viola-
tion of the first amendment to the United States Constitution, to use its
property as a forum for the speech of others was rejected. 32
125 Id. at 721.
126 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
430 U.S. at 720-21.
129 Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.
ill Id. at 721.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
132 Id. at 85-88. 22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol31/iss3/6
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This array of potentially analogous cases offers an excellent opportu-
nity to test whether a judicial focus on the nature of the individuals' ac-
tivity in order to determine whether there has been either an actual or
apparent assertion of the truth of the government's ideological message
has a principled doctrinal foundation. Obviously, it must be remembered
that it is insufficient to point out hypothetical cases which, if Wooley were
decided in one fashion, would be inappropriately decided if the Court
adhered to the sanctity of precedent as a mandate for doctrinal consis-
tency. The slippery slope always runs in both directions. Jurisprudential
soundness requires a principle which, when consistently applied, justifies
acceptable results in each of the proffered hypothetical cases. A focus
on the nature of the individuals' activity always fails this simple standard.
The essential purpose of the proposed judicial inquiry into whether the
individual was placed "in the position of either apparently or actually
'asserting as true' the [government's] message"1 is to reject as insuffi-
cient the implication which arises necessarily from the simple display of
the message. Thus, Justice Rehnquist denied there was any compelled
affirmation of belief in Wooley because the Maynards were simply required
to display the state motto, not personally endorse it. The difficulty with
this proposed standard is that it wholly fails to distinguish the cases in
which even Justice Rehnquist would find a first amendment violation.
Barnette appears, on superficial examination, to meet this test inasmuch
as not merely a flag salute but also a pledge of allegiance was required.134
On closer examination, however, the Jehovah's Witnesses in Barnette ob-
jected to participating in the flag salute ceremony on religious grounds
and, on this basis, the state regulation compelled only the participation
in the ceremony and expressly disclaimed any coercion of belief in the
message which the flag salute and pledge of allegiance expresses.3 ' Fur-
thermore, this standard also fails to distinguish the case of the required
wearing of a lapel button promoting a political candidate, offered by
Justice Rehnquist as another example of a constitutionally permissible
coerced affirmation of belief unless Justice Rehnquist would invalidate
such a lapel button only if it read "I support Ken Candidate for Presi-
dent" rather than merely "Ken Candidate for President." The case of the
required waving of a flag as an example suffers from the same infirmity.
It is difficult to appreciate the wisdom of a constitutional principle which
would have the result turn on the redundancy of a requirement that the
flag waver also be compelled to add verbally "and I mean it."
Justice Rehnquist also suggested that a relevant factor in applying his
133 430 U.S. at 721.
134 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628-29 (1943).
131 The official resolution at issue provided: "the West Virginia State Board
of Education honors the broad principle that one's conviction about the ultimate
mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach of
the law .... " Id. at 626-28 n.2.
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proposed standard is whether the audience would perceive the govern-
mentally compelled activity as an affirmation of belief in the government's
message.""6 The difficulties inherent in any standard based on the percep-
tion of an audience are legion.' Here, however, the problem is even more
fundamental. Mere compliance with a governmental mandate to display
an officially approved message, by whatever means, cannot alone be con-
strued reasonably to be anything other than simple obedience to law. Such
compliance says nothing about whether the individuals believe, disbelieve,
or even care about the content of the government's message. Unless one
accepts the intellectually indefensible position that the touchstone is the
notoriety of the governmental regulation, any reliance on audience percep-
tion is doomed to failure unless other factors are considered.
Justice Rehnquist would apparently resolve this problem by reference
to whether the individuals are free to disavow the government's
message.'38 Thus, in his view there was no compelled affirmation of belief
in Wooley because the Maynards were free to disclaim the state motto
by attaching a counter-bumpersticker on their automobiles.139 No doubt
such a bumpersticker would prevent viewers from misperceiving the
Maynards' actual beliefs. This factor does not, however, distinguish the
hypothetical cases offered by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion
in Wooley. For example, the school children in Barnette, and their parents,
were free to "disavow as publicly as they choose to do so the meaning
that others attach to the gesture of salute."'' 0
If Justice Rehnquist was not suggesting the overruling of Barnette, or
at least demonstrating an inability to distinguish it, then he must have
been implying that the opportunity for individual disclaimer must be con-
temporaneous in time and space. In addition to the obvious difficulty of
identifying the requisite degree of contemporaneity, subsequent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court clearly indicate that students sub-
jected to a compulsory flag salute ceremony could contemporaneously
register their dissent by wearing an armband"I or a jacket emblazoned
with the slogan "Down With the Salute," or maybe even "Fuck the
Salute."'4
The freedom to disavow the government's message is also present in
136 430 U.S. at 720-21.
"3 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
,3' In Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722, Justice Rehnquist states: "Since any implication
that they affirm the motto can be so easily displaced, I cannot agree that the
state [statutel . . . may be invalidated under the fiction that appellees are un-
constitutionally forced to affirm, or profess belief in, the state motto."
139 Id.
' Barnette, 319 U.S. at 664 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Taylor v. Missis-
sippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
... Cf Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
14. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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the other examples of impermissible coerced affirmations of belief sug-
gested by Justice Rehnquist. Individuals required to wear a lapel button
supporting a political candidate could easily disclaim affiliation with the
government's message by wearing a second lapel button.
Despite these analytical difficulties, Justice Rehnquist expressly relied
on the ability of the owners of the shopping center in Robins to disassociate
themselves from endorsement of the third parties' message to distinguish
Wooley and Barnette and justify the finding of no first amendment
violation."3 As Justice Powell observed in his concurring opinion in Robins,
Justice Rehnquist's methodology does not alleviate the individuals'
dilemma but merely shifts its focus:
The property owner or proprietor would be faced with a choice:
he either could permit his customers to receive a mistaken im-
pression or he could disavow the messages. Should he take the
first course, he effectively has been compelled to affirm someone
else's belief. Should he choose the second, he has been forced to
speak when he would prefer to remain silent. In short, he has
lost control over his freedom to speak or not to speak on certain
issues. The mere fact that he is free to dissociate himself from
the views expressed on his property ... cannot restore his "right
to refrain from speaking at all."1" '
Finally, in Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion alluded to yet another factor: whether the governmen-
tal views would "likely be identified with those of the owner'. 5 of the
shopping mall compelled to display the message. In order to avoid the
obvious conclusion that the simple fact of official compulsion to display
the message negates any reasonable inference that the coerced individuals
endorse the message, Justice Rehnquist would focus on whether the
display of the message was required to be on property "limited to the
personal use"'46 of the owner.
This consideration successfully distinguishes Robins and justifies the
holding that no violation of any first amendment right was present there
since the shopping center was "open to the public to come and go as they
447 U.S. at 87-88.
'" Id. at 99, quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. Justice Powell also noted that
requiring the property owner to identify the messages to which he objects would
"force him to relinquish his freedom to maintain his own beliefs without public
disclosure." Id. at 100, quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 213,
241 (1977).
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's analysis frequently places on the individuals
the financial burden of expending personal funds for a bumpersticker, or lapel
button to disavow personal association with the government's message in situa-
tions where the individuals' preference is the exercise of the right to remain silent.
"' Id. at 87.
146 Id.
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please."'' 7 Erection by the government of billboards with ideological
statements financed at taxpayers' expense would be an even more ex-
treme example of no constitutional violation because there would be no
identification of any particular taxpayer with the message. On the other
hand, the compulsory flag salute ceremony in Barnette involved such direct
personal participation that it serves as an appropriate benchmark for
clearly unconstitutional infringements of personal liberty under this
analysis.
Barnette and Robins, however, mark rather obvious extremes at op-
posite ends of the spectrum of cases. The difficulty with this methodology
is that it places the cases on a continuum and then fails to provide any
principled standard to distinguish between the myriad cases which oc-
cupy the middle of the spectrum. No doctrinal structure exists to aid in
the determination of whether the state motto embossed on New Hamp-
shire license plates is sufficiently closely connected to the person of
automobile owners to be violative of the first amendment. Nor is it clear
what weight should be given to the personal effort required to install
the license plate. The mottoes on American money, "In God We Trust"
and "E Pluribus Unum," present similar difficulties of analysis. Thus, Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Wooley correctly recognized
that while the compulsory flag salute was more offensive than the man-
datory license plate display of the state motto, "the difference is essen-
tially one of degree."' s This insight led the Chief Justice to conclude that
the first amendment right to be free of a compelled affirmation of belief
was implicated, thus necessitating an evaluation of the state's counter-
vailing interests."' What remains unclear, however, is the virtue of focus-
ing on the individuals' activity solely for the purpose of erecting an un-
necessary barrier to constitutional adjudication."
Chief Justice Burger, after concluding that the interest in being free
from any coerced affirmation of belief was implicated to some unstated
and unascertainable extent, wisely placed little reliance on that finding
in deciding Wooley. Rather than focusing on the nature of the individuals'
activity, the majority in Wooley premised its analysis on an examination
of the character of the governmental regulation.
The state of New Hampshire advanced two interests in support of its
statute requiring the display of the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on
passenger vehicle license plates: 1) the promotion of an appreciation of
history, state pride and individualism, and 2) the facilitation of identifica-
tion of properly licensed vehicles."' The challenged New Hampshire
statute attempted to achieve the first state purpose of promoting an ap-
147 Id.
1 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
1"9 Id. at 715-16.
1-5 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716.
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preciation of state pride, history and individualism by the mandatory
public display of the state motto to all who viewed the passenger vehicle
license plates. The evil the governmental regulation was designed to pre-
vent was interference with the public dissemination of the state's message
by those who dissented from the government's ideological statement and
were thus unwilling to carry the message on their privately ov, ned
automobiles. Chief Justice Burger was able to focus the judicial inquiry
on the proper question of the compatability of this governmental regula-
tion with the command of the first amendment by phrasing the issue to
be "whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to par-
ticipate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it
on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that
it be observed and read by the public." ' The majority's conclusion in
Wooley was simply that such an ideologically non-neutral, content-based
governmental interest is inconsistent with the command of the first
amendment.
In order to fully appreciate the doctrinal significance of the holding
in Wooley it must be recognized that the government does have a
legitimate interest in participating in public debate. 15 As Professor Emer-
son has explained, such governmental participation in the marketplace
of ideas is not merely an evil to be tolerated, but
is an essential feature of any democratic society. It enables the
government to inform, explain and persuade -measures especially
crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum
use of force. Government participation also greatly enriches the
system; it provides the facts, ideas, and expertise not available
from other sources. In short, government expression is a necessary
and healthy part of the system.'T
The recognition of a legitimate governmental interest in the dissemina-
tion of its own ideological message, however, is merely a beginning, not
the end, of first amendment analysis.1 5 5 This is especially true given the
15' Id. at 713.
1 See, e.g., id. at 717 ("[TJhe State is seeking to communicate to others an of-
ficial view .... Of course, the State may legitimately pursue such interests in
any number of ways."); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) ("[Tjhe
state or national governments constitutionally may forbid anyone from mishandl-
ing in any manner a flag that is public property."); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640
(1943) ("National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and
example is not in question.").
1"4 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970).
M55 The Supreme Court has addressed this topic of government speech only
in dicta. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. The recent proliferation of
scholarly literature is indicative of the fact that the constitutional contours of
this governmental interest are yet to be defined. See, e.g., M. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1982); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied
Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1105 (1979); Ziegler, Government
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potentially limitless reach of this governmental interest. The government's
desire to burden individuals' activity on the ground that it is officially
deemed to espouse an idea the government believes to be undesirable,
unwise, inappropriate or false-an interest which Barnette teaches is ab-
solutely impermissible under the first amendment-can easily be re-
phrased by the government as an interest in preventing interference with
a message the government has officially declared to be desirable, wise,
appropriate or true. This is so because any individual activity which
espouses an idea contrary to the official message competes for public at-
tention and acceptance with the latter and thus reduces to some greater
or lesser extent the government's persuasive effectiveness. Thus it would
appear that Wooley announces an absolute first amendment principle:
"[Where the state's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how
acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's right
to avoid becoming the courier for such message.""s
Professor David Gaebler, however, has rejected this analysis and has
argued:
While the content-based/content-neutral distinction is appropriate
in the affirmative first amendment context, it does not appear
applicable to the negative first amendment context. The dangers
implicit in government discrimination against particular views do
not arise when government discriminates in favor of particular
views, at least when it does so either by expressing those views
itself or by compelling others to express them. It has been sug-
gested that the "free marketplace of ideas" may be undermined
as readily by government protection of particular views. However,
this proposition as stated is too broad. Of course special protec-
tion of particular views is often tantamount to a restriction upon
all other views. Where government protection of particular views
works a concomitant restriction on other views, government pro-
tection is as injurious to freedom of expression as government
restriction.... However, when government discrimination in favor
of particular views takes the form of the government's merely
adding its own voice to the throng on behalf of that view, there
is no concomitant restriction on the expression of other views.
Government expression does affect the relative quantity of ex-
pression of various views but does not restrict any expression
on the basis of content. Similarly, government compelled expres-
sion does not restrict expression of any specific views but, rather,
only affects the relative quantity of all expression.... Thus, while
compelled expression may infringe upon individual interests it
Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV.
579 (1980).
11 430 U.S. at 717 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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should not be condemned as an interference with the "free market-
place of ideas." 
15 7
Professor Gaebler's analysis is severely flawed. It must be remembered
that federal, state and local governments occupy a unique position in our
society due to the enormous power and influence they wield. As Professor
Thomas Emerson has noted, the government controls many of the sources
of information in our society, has virtually unlimited access to the means
of communication, and the nature of governmental expression is
qualitatively different than that of expression by private individuals
because "[t]he tendency of government expression to be uniform and
repetitive in its message gives it a more concentrated impact than other
expression."'58 Most importantly, the government possesses a total
monopoly on the legitimate use of force, a factor which alone distinguishes
the government from any other participant in the arena of public debate.
Indeed, Wooley limited its holding to the principle that the first amend-
ment prohibits the government from impermissibly abusing its exclusive
control of the legitimate use of force in our society by conscripting un-
willing citizens as foot soldiers for the public dissemination of its
ideological message. 5 '
The content-based/content-neutral distinction, then, has great
significance regardless of whether the government is burdening individual
activity for the purpose of suppressing the content of private expression
or for the purpose of favoring the content of governmental expression.
No doubt there are dangers implicit in governmental efforts to regulate
on a non-content basis, too. To suggest more rigorous constitutional
scrutiny for content-based regulations, however, is not to endorse the aban-
donment of judicial scrutiny of non-content regulations. 6'
The dangers of ideological discrimination are greater when the govern-
ment regulates on the basis of the content of expression, regardless of
source, than when the government simply encourages pluralist expres-
sion without regard to the content of the messages. The danger that the
government will be unable to fulfill its role as an "umpire," overseeing
the effective functioning of the "marketplace of ideas" in an ideologically
neutral manner, is always a matter of grave concern. This concern is
heightened whenever the government attempts to regulate on the basis
of the content of expression. If the government is acting in the conflict-
ing roles of both umpire and participant in the "marketplace of ideas,"
in primafacie violation of the principle that no one should be permitted
57 Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Ex-
pression and Association, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995, 1008-09 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
"' T. Emerson, supra note 154, at 698.
159 430 U.S. at 717.
' o See infra text accompanying notes 183-88.
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to be the judge of her own cause,"1 ' then the vigilance of the judiciary
must be very strict indeed.
When the government burdens individual activity in order to favor the
content of its own messages and thereby furthers its own ideological self-
interest it strikes at the very heart of the first amendment guarantee.
Given the pre-existing, natural advantages the government possesses as
a participant in the arena of public debate, the danger is enormous that
any governmental exercise of its exclusive authority to burden individual
activity for the purpose of enhancing its own ideological message will
result in the first amendment being uncoupled from its essential function
of preserving an open, democratic society.16" ' The fundamental principle
underlying the constitutional guarantee of free expression embodied in
the first amendment was aptly stated by Justice Jackson in Barnette:
"We set up government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights
denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.
Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion
by authority."1 " As James Madison recognized, the very "nature of
Republican Government," presupposes and demands that "the censorial
power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government
over the people."' ' The danger that governmental expression, especially
when artificially enhanced by the government's exercise of its total con-
trol over the legitimate use of coercion in our society, will drown out
countervailing expression by private individuals thus threatens to turn
not only the first amendment but also the democratic premise of our
government on its head.
The majority opinion in Wooley simply recognized that, as a matter
of principle, the government interest in compelling unwilling citizens to
assist in the dissemination of the government's ideological message by
publicly displaying it for the express purpose that it be viewed by others
is so intimately connected to the central concerns of the first amendment
as to be deemed constitutionally impermissible. This is true whether the
government coerces the display of a slogan on a license plate, a flag salute,
or the wearing of a campaign button for the proscribed purpose. On this
analysis Wooley and Barnette are, as a matter of fundamental first amend-
ment principle, not merely analogous, but doctrinal twins. It is simply
11 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); Dworkin, The
Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, NEW YORK REV. BOOKS, May 4, 1972, at 27.
11' See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Gard, The Absoluteness of the First Amendment, 58 NEB. L.
REV. 1053 (1979); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191. Cf. BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of
Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
13 319 U.S. at 641.
16 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794).
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contrary to the democratic premise of the first amendment to allow the
government to compel the unconsenting to use their person or privately
owned property "as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological
message." '165
The countervailing hypothetical case offered by Justice Rehnquist, in
his dissenting opinion in Wooley, appears superficially to cast doubt on
the doctrinal foundations of this analysis:
For example, were New Hampshire to erect a multitude of
billboards, each proclaiming "Live Free or Die," and tax all citizens
for the cost of erection and maintenance, clearly the message
would be "fostered" by the individual citizen-taxpayers and just
as clearly those individuals would be "instruments" in that com-
munication. Certainly, however, that case would not fall within
the ambit of Barnette.1
66
Upon closer inspection, however, the appeal of Justice Rehnquist's argu-
ment is illusory. Thus, it may be that the prime fallacy of Justice Rehn-
quist's analysis is his conclusion that "that case would not fall within the
ambit of Barnette."'167 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education168 is a major
precedent suggesting that the first amendment would be violated by any
governmentally compelled financial support for ideological governmental
expression. In Abood, the United States Supreme Court, expressly rely-
ing on Barnette,6 9 held that the governmentally compelled financial sup-
port for the ideological activities of a public employees' union, as a condi-
tion of government employment, was violative of the first amendment
rights of dissenting union members and those required to pay union serv-
ice charges in lieu of membership dues."'
Even if it is true that "the legitimacy of government communication
activities, the difficulties in identifying and labeling ideological, noncon-
troversial, or political speech, and the sheer folly of attempting to calculate
how much of an individual's taxes are spent for specific, objectionable
government communications" 7 ' counsel against applying Abood to cases
involving taxpayers, it does not follow, as Justice Rehnquist argued, that
this compels the conclusion that Wooley was wrongly decided. In Justice
Rehnquist's billboard hypothetical the governmental interest at stake is
the government's interest in itself communicating to the populace, not
to require individual citizens to unwillingly carry the official message.
165 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715.
166 Id. at 721.
167 Id.
166 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
169 Id. at 235.
170 Id. at 233-37.
"' Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expres-
sion and the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 863, 893 (1979).
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Inasmuch as the government can only express itself or disseminate its
message by the expenditure of tax revenues, to hold that the use of such
revenues constitutes an impermissible requirement of participation by
the unwilling taxpayer would be to wholly defeat the government's
asserted claim of a right to express itself.'
The majority opinion in Wooley sensitively decided only the issue before
it, holding simply that an explicit governmental interest in using its ex-
clusive power of legitimate coercion to conscript unwilling persons as foot
soldiers to act as amplifying devices for the public dissemination of its
ideological message is so closely related to the central concerns of the
first amendment that it cannot be constitutionally permitted. '73 Stated
in another manner, an explicit governmental purpose of requiring object-
ing citizens to advertise publicly the government's message constitutes
an unfair method of competition in the marketplace of ideas.
The second governmental interest asserted by New Hampshire in sup-
port of its requirement that citizens display the motto "Live Free or Die"
on the license plates of their passenger vehicles was the facilitation of
identification of properly licensed vehicles."" This interest, wholly
unrelated to the content of the governmentally compelled message, was
premised on the notion that since the motto only appeared on license plates
issued for non-commercial vehicles the state could easily discover the
misuse of a commercial license plate on a non-commercial vehicle, or vice
versa, by reference to the presence or absence of the motto on the license
plate.' Inasmuch as this was a non-content based governmental interest
the Supreme Court subjected it to less rigorous scrutiny. Nevertheless,
the New Hampshire regulation could not withstand this lessened stan-
dard of review.
First, the Supreme Court pointed out that the state's asserted interest
was not supported on the factual record because New Hampshire non-
commercial license plates normally bore a specific configuration of let-
ters and numbers which adequately distinguished them from commercial
license plates.17 1 Second, the Court found that the state could achieve its
purpose by "less drastic means."1 77 The most obvious less drastic alter-
native would be for New Hampshire to emboss the word "non-commercial"
on the appropriate license plates. In other words, there is a gross con-
stitutional impropriety in the official selection of a content-based govern-
mental means to achieve a non-content-based governmental interest.
172 See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 589-91.
1 430 U.S. at 717 ("[Wlhere the state's interest is to disseminate an ideology
... such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message.").
174 Id. at 716.
175 Id. at 716 n.12.
176 Id. at 716.
177 Id. at 716-17.
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On first impression it would appear that the mottoes "In God We Trust"
and "E Pluribus Unum" on United States currency would succumb to the
scrutiny applied in Wooley. This, however, is not necessarily true. As the
Supreme Court noted: "Currency is generally carried in a purse or pocket
and need not be displayed to the public. The bearer of currency is thus
not required to publicly advertise the national motto.""' It is equally true
that the traditional use of these mottoes, in a furtherance of the legitimate
and indisputably important non-content-based governmental interest in
the prevention of counterfeiting, arguably has caused them to lose their
ideological character. 9 Most important, however, is the fact that Justice
Rehnquist's invocation of this hypothetical is based on a misapprehen-
sion of the character of the federal statute at issue. Unlike the New Hamp-
shire statutory scheme, federal law is sensitive to the serious first amend-
ment problem raised by the presence of the national mottoes, "In God
We Trust" and "E Pluribus Unum," on United States currency and
criminalizes the obliteration of these mottoes only when accompanied by
a specific intent to defraud. 80 This may be precisely the sort of a less
drastic alternative alluded to in Wooley.
In Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins,18 ' the United States Supreme
Court upheld a state's non-content-based requirement that a privately
owned shopping center open its premises to the speech and petitioning
activities of private individuals. In so doing the Court explicitly disting-
uished Wooley as involving a content-based governmental regulation where
"the government itself prescribed the message."'82 Consequently, the
Supreme Court applied the less rigorous balancing formula traditionally
appropriate for the review of non-content-based governmental
regulations.' '
While it is true that the non-content-based regulation at issue in
Robins served the significant governmental interest and first amend-
ment value of opening a new forum for all speakers and all points of view
and presented "no danger of governmental discrimination for or against
a particular message,""' it cannot be confidently concluded that "[o]pen-
ing private property to pluralist expression poses none of the dangers
that compelled speech doctrine is designed to prevent." ' Indeed, this
is precisely why judicial review of non-content-based governmental regula-
tions, although properly less rigorous than the scrutiny applied to content-
176 Id. at 717 n.15.
179 Cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Sheiner, 273 F. Supp. 977 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 410
F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1967); United States v. Lissner, 12 F. 840 (Mass. 1882).
,61 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
182 Id. at 87.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 The Supreme Court,. 1979 Term, 94 HARv. L. REV. 77, 171 n.23 (1980).
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based regulations, is not toothless. On the other hand, Professor Gaebler
is simply wrong when he asserts:
Moreover, the content-based/content-neutral distinction also fails
to help identify negative first amendment cases in which the in-
fringement of individual interests is particularly severe. For ex-
ample, the Court held in Barnette that the state may not require
school children to recite the pledge of allegiance. Suppose instead
a state requirement that school children recite, not the pledge
of allegiance per se, but rather, a message to be selected by some
non-government entity and that message selected happened to
be the pledge of allegiance. Although in this case the government
would not have mandated any particular message, the infringe-
ment of individual interests would not seem any less severe.188
It is inappropriate to criticize the Court's lesser scrutiny of non-content
regulations with an example of a content regulation; clearly the govern-
ment cannot avoid Barnette by delegating the choice of the message to
a particular private organization and then placing its monopoly police
power behind the message selected. Thus, Professor Gaebler is correct,
in a perverse sense, when he concludes that "it makes little difference
whether it is the government or the nongovernmental entity that chooses
the specific message." '187 Unfortunately, the flaw in Professor Gaebler's
analysis is that he ignores the central tenet of permissible non-content
governmental regulations, expressed most clearly in the Supreme Court's
"public forum" cases, that if a forum is open to one person or idea it must
be equally open to all.188
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Frankfurter, prior to his appointment to the United States
Supreme Court, made a comment which later guided his judicial perform-
ance in free speech cases: "[W]ith the great men of the Supreme Court
constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft. . . . The great
judges are those to whom the Constitution is not primarily a text for
interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a progressive people."' "
In contrast to the view of Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson did not
believe that the only choice of a proper role for a jurist was either deferen-
tial or activist Platonic Guardian." The clear import of the majority opin-
ion in Barnette was that the members of the Court had a duty to expound
188 Gaebler, supra note 115, at 1010.
187 Id.
'88 See, e.g., Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1.
189 F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 75-76 (1930).
18 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissent-
ing), quoting L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
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the fundamental law of the Constitution and not to act as statesmen, with
or without a sense of modesty, determining as a matter of "personal
preference" whether "the legislators" solution is too strong for the "judicial
stomach."'' For Justice Jackson the Constitution was a text for judicial
interpretation, and it was the Court's constitutional duty to enforce the
first amendment's command that the government is absolutely proscribed
from attempting to achieve political orthodoxy by the means of compel-
ling or prohibiting the expression of any statement because of the
ideological agreement or disagreement of those who hold political office
at that time in history. In the first "balancing"/"absolute" debate, the
absolutist, Justice Jackson, had all the better of the argument.
"' L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70:
[J]udges... do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into
consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial
stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their [decision] in a protective
veil of adjectives such as "arbitrary," .... reasonable .... or "essential,"
whose office usually, though quite innocently, is to disguise what they
are doing and impute to it a derivation far more impressive than their per-
sonal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision ....
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